The U.S. Department of War added a new file to its PURSUE archive on May 8, 2026, cataloged as DOW-UAP-D62. The document is a standard Mission Report form, typically completed by pilots as a routine procedure. However, the event it describes took place on September 16, 2020, meaning nearly five years and eight months elapsed between the incident and its public release.
According to the report, a U.S. military operator departed from a location designated “OK.AS” at 2302Z. The mission’s objective was to support NAVCENT operations across the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman.
The operator was assigned to the 482 ATKS, part of the 432 AEW wing, under U.S. Central Command. The mission type was listed as “AREC,” and the aircraft carried a target pod identified as “ANDAS4.” During the flight, the operator recorded multiple “guard calls” on the emergency frequency. At 1248Z and again at 1414Z, the aircraft experienced data link failures.
Two such failures during a single mission over the Strait of Hormuz are considered unusual. Later, at 1732Z, the operator reported a UAP at an estimated altitude of 1,800 feet.
The Department of War included a caveat with the release, stating that the report’s descriptive language reflects the operator’s subjective interpretation at the time and should not be taken as conclusive evidence of any intrinsic object features or performance characteristics. This is standard legal language intended to protect the government. The timing of the incident is significant.
September 2020 was a period of heightened tension in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran had been interfering with commercial shipping, and the U.S. Navy was conducting constant patrols.
CENTCOM had its air assets on a short leash. Into this crowded and tense battlespace, an object appeared at 1,800 feet that a trained U.S. military operator could not identify. The operator returned to “OK.AS” at 1958Z.
The mission concluded, and the form was filed. No public disclosure occurred for five and a half years.
The PURSUE archive operates on a scheduled release system, not in real time, meaning the public always receives information after a significant delay. By the time a citizen reads DOW-UAP-D62, the operator has likely moved on, the unit has rotated, and the aircraft has flown hundreds of sorties since. The document confirms that the military’s reporting system functions. Pilots observe anomalies, complete the required forms, and those forms enter a system that eventually reaches the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office.
AARO was established by congressional mandate, and the Department of War releases documents due to legal transparency requirements. However, the gap between event and release is substantial enough that accountability remains diffuse.
The Strait of Hormuz incident represents one data point in a growing archive. It does not constitute proof of alien technology or foreign espionage. It does confirm that a U.S. military operator, flying a mission marked by two data link failures and multiple guard calls, observed something at 1,800 feet that did not correspond to any known aircraft in the battlespace.
The form states this. The Department of War acknowledges it.
The public now knows because a PDF was finally released. The PURSUE archive will continue releasing documents. AARO will continue its analysis.
Operators will keep filing reports. And the public will continue learning about events that occurred years earlier, in locations like the Strait of Hormuz, where the stakes were already elevated before the UAP appeared.
