The U.S. Army will field up to 15 counter‑drone systems in Morocco next year, aiming to shield forward command posts from the growing menace of small‑to‑medium unmanned aircraft. The trials, slated for early 2027 near Tan‑Tan, will expose how Group 1, 2 and 3 drones constrain the Army’s ability to test and field these technologies.
Accelerated Capability Event: A Fast‑Track Test Bed
The effort falls under the Accelerated Capability Event (ACE) programme, a joint venture of the Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF‑AF) and the Global Tactical Edge Acquisition Directorate (G‑TEAD). According to the Army, ACE is designed to compress the gap between a requirement, a solution and fielding to roughly 180 days.
Initial demonstrations are scheduled for February and March 2027, followed by an operational assessment in April and May during African Lion 2027, the biennial joint exercise hosted in Morocco. G‑TEAD will work with the Portfolio Acquisition Executive Fires to validate the candidate systems, with the ultimate goal of selecting equipment for broader Army adoption.
The location near Tan‑Tan offers a sparsely populated desert environment that mimics the open‑terrain conditions where forward command posts are often established. The setting also limits the presence of conventional air‑defence assets, forcing the trials to rely entirely on the counter‑UAS solutions under evaluation.
The Five Capability Categories Under Test
Evaluators will examine an integrated, transportable counter‑UAS kit that promises rapid deployment and a self‑contained defensive package. The kit is expected to bundle detection, command‑and‑control and defeat elements into a single, movable unit.
Detection systems may employ a mix of radar, electro‑optical sensors and radio‑frequency monitoring, giving operators the ability to spot drones across the spectrum of size and altitude. The Army’s documents stress that the sensors must function in the harsh desert heat and sand‑laden atmosphere typical of the Tan‑Tan region.
Kinetic defeat solutions will physically destroy hostile aircraft using interceptors or other projectile weapons. By contrast, non‑kinetic options will rely on electronic‑warfare techniques to jam or spoof the drone’s communications and navigation links, rendering it ineffective without a single shot fired.
Passive protection, the fifth category, encompasses hardening measures such as shielding, camouflage and emission‑control procedures that reduce a command post’s vulnerability before any active counter‑UAS system is engaged.
The Army has not yet disclosed which manufacturers or specific models will compete in the trials, leaving the exact composition of the five categories open to speculation.
Group 1‑3 Unmanned Aircraft: The Operational Bottleneck
Group 1 drones are the smallest class, typically under 2 kg, equipped with low‑cost cameras and limited endurance. Their size makes them difficult to detect with traditional radar, forcing reliance on RF or EO sensors.
Group 2 platforms range up to 25 kg and can carry modest payloads, including explosives. Their greater endurance and higher flight ceilings expand the surveillance envelope, threatening forward units that lack organic air‑defence coverage.
Group 3 UAVs approach the size of tactical aircraft, capable of carrying heavier payloads and operating at higher altitudes. They can conduct persistent ISR or deliver precision munitions, blurring the line between a drone and a manned combat aircraft.
All three groups can operate in swarms, complicating detection and engagement. The Army’s briefing notes that these threats “create additional difficulties for units establishing temporary positions, particularly when conventional air‑defence assets are not yet available.” Consequently, any test in Morocco must contend with a spectrum of targets that strain sensor bandwidth, data‑link latency and the rules of engagement for kinetic versus non‑kinetic defeat.
The diversity of the threat set limits the number of systems that can be evaluated simultaneously. Each trial must allocate sensor time, range safety zones and electronic‑spectrum resources, effectively throttling the pace at which the 15 solutions can be exercised.
Recent Acquisitions: A Glimpse of What May Appear
Although the Army has not named the trial participants, recent procurements hint at the technologies likely to be on the table. In 2026 the directorate secured 50 Merops counter‑UAS systems, a platform that proved its worth in the Russian‑Ukrainian conflict and has since been fielded by NATO allies.
Perennial Autonomy, a Silicon‑Valley‑spun defence firm, holds a Department of Defense framework contract worth up to US$500 million for AI‑enabled counter‑drone systems, including Merops, Bumblebee and Hornet. The contract, awarded in May 2026, underscores the Pentagon’s confidence in AI‑driven detection and electronic‑attack capabilities.
The Bumblebee system, showcased by Sgt. 1st Class Andrew Santiago at African Lion 2026, exemplifies a kinetic‑non‑kinetic hybrid that can engage fast‑moving first‑person‑view drones. Its presence in Morocco’s upcoming trials would provide a direct link between the Army’s recent fielding and the ACE evaluation.
These acquisitions illustrate a shift toward modular, software‑centric solutions that can be rapidly re‑tasked across the Group 1‑3 spectrum. However, the lack of public manufacturer identification for the ACE trials means the Army must still validate whether these off‑the‑shelf systems can integrate into the transportable kit and meet the desert‑environment requirements.
Deployment Scenarios, Timelines and Remaining Gaps
During the February–March 2027 demonstrations, each counter‑UAS solution will be mounted on a mobile platform and tested against a scripted set of drone incursions representing the three groups. The subsequent operational assessment in April–May, conducted under the auspices of African Lion 2027, will introduce live‑fire exercises and electronic‑warfare scenarios to gauge kinetic and non‑kinetic effectiveness.
Because the trials occur in a remote desert, logistical support is limited to what the transportable kit can carry. This constraint forces the Army to evaluate not only the technical performance of each system but also its sustainment footprint—a critical factor for forward command posts that may operate for weeks without resupply.
The need to protect against a wide array of aerial threats compresses the test schedule. With 15 systems vying for limited range‑time, the Army must prioritize certain threat profiles, potentially leaving some niche capabilities under‑examined.
Finally, the absence of publicly confirmed manufacturers means that the ACE programme cannot yet assess interoperability with existing Army networks or the long‑term logistics pipeline. Until the post‑trial selection phase, the operational limitation remains: the Army can only prove that a system works in a controlled desert environment, not that it will seamlessly integrate into the broader force structure.
Sources
- U.S. Army to Test 15 Counter-Drone Systems in Morocco to Protect Troops at Forward Command Posts
- Perennial Autonomy
- General Dynamics showcases Wolf XM30, new counter-drone systems at AUSA
Photo: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc (CC0)
